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                             OPINION 
                                            
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
     Alice Charles appeals from the judgment of conviction of the District 
Court of the 
Virgin Islands finding her guilty of knowingly and intentionally 
manufacturing 
marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C.  841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).  Charles 
contends that 
the District Court erred in denying her motion to suppress the evidence of 
drugs allegedly 
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  We will affirm the judgment 
of the 
District Court. 
                               I. 
     On May 4, 1999, Officers Angel Diaz and Christopher Howell, members 
of the 
Virgin Islands High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Task Force, received 
an anonymous 
tip from a "concerned citizen" that the renter of No. 8 Catherine's Rest 
Estates, St. Croix, 
United States Virgin Islands ("No. 8"), was growing marijuana in her 
residence and 
selling it at a local school.  The officers had no prior contact or 
experience with the 
informant.  On three occasions over a period of approximately two weeks 
the officers 
surveilled No. 8, which was located on land known as Martin Farm, a 
fenced-in property 
containing No. 8 and several other rental houses.  The fence surrounding 
Martin Farm 
had an opening which allowed car access to a dirt road known as Martin 
Farmer's Road.  
No. 8 was located approximately one quarter of a mile from the entrance of 
Martin Farm 
on Martin Farmer's Road.  During the three visits to No. 8, the officers 
observed that the 
air conditioning was always running, all of the windows were shut, and no 
one appeared 
to be in the house, except on May 20, 1999, when Charles was arrested. 
     On May 18, 1999, the same concerned citizen contacted Officer Diaz 
and stated 
that the renter at No. 8 came to the residence for only a few hours each 
day, but that the 
air conditioning remained on at all times and that the windows were always 
shut.  
Officers Diaz and Howell went to the house at 4:45 a.m. on May 19, 1999, 
and again 
observed that the air conditioning was running and that no one appeared to 
be at the 
house.  Officer Diaz ran a swab across the outside door latch attached to 
the screen door 
that led to the screened-in front porch.  An Ionscan was performed on the 
swab revealing 
a high presence of marijuana. 
     The next morning, Officer Diaz and INS Special Agent David Levering 
(assigned 
to the same task force as Officer Diaz) returned to No. 8.  A blue car was 
parked outside 
the house, which had not been present on any previous visit.  All of the 
windows to the 
house were closed.  Officer Diaz opened the unlocked screen door, walked 
approximately eight or ten feet through the screened-in porch, and knocked 
on the front 
door.  Charles answered from inside the house, without opening the front 
door.  The 
officers stated that it was the police.  Charles opened the door and 
stepped onto the 
porch.  The officers observed that the air conditioning was on inside the 
house, and 
almost immediately also detected the smell of growing marijuana.  The 
officers asked 
Charles if any illegal activity was going on inside the house, to which 
Charles answered 
in the negative.  The officers then asked if they could go into the house.  
Charles refused 
and told the officers that they needed a warrant to go inside.   
     Officer Diaz told Charles that she could not go back inside the house 
because of 
his fear that she would destroy evidence.  Charles told Officer Diaz that 
she needed to 
use the bathroom.  Officer Diaz told her to go to a neighbor's house or 
that he would take 
her to the police station to use the facilities, but that she could not go 
into the house.  
Charles then bolted to inside the house locking the door behind her.  
Within moments, 
the officers heard the sound of a flushing toilet.  Officer Diaz unplugged 
the water pump 
outside the house and started to use a masonry block to knock the front 
door down.  At 
one point Charles yelled from behind the door for Officer Diaz to stop and 
she would 
open the door.  But too much damage had been done to the door and Officer 
Diaz had to 
break it down.  Once inside the house, the officers arrested Charles and 
surveilled each 
room to make sure no one else was inside.  During their surveillance of 
the house, they 
observed live marijuana plants in the bedroom and in the toilet bowl. 
     Officer Diaz provided the affidavit used to obtain the search warrant 
for No. 8.  
He included in the affidavit: the informant's tip on May 18, 1999; his 
observations of 
No. 8 made on the morning of May 19, 1999, which corroborated the 
informant's 
information; the results of the Ionscan; the smell of fresh marijuana upon 
Charles 
opening the door on the morning of May 20, 1999.  Also included was the 
chain of 
events on May 20, 1999, when Charles ran back into the house and the 
officers secured 
the house as well as detained Charles.  
     A Magistrate Judge granted a search warrant which included No. 8 and 
the blue 
car parked outside of the house.  In executing the warrant, forty-six live 
marijuana plants 
were seized.  The officers used the information from the search of No. 8 
and Charles' car 
to obtain a second warrant for Charles' other residence, No. 11E Estate 
Pleasant, St. 
Croix, Virgin Islands ("No. 11E").  Officers seized drying marijuana from 
this second 
house. 
                              II. 
     A grand jury returned a three-count indictment.  It charged Charles 
with the 
manufacture of a controlled substance, marijuana, in violation of 21 
U.S.C.  841(a) & 
(b)(1)(C), possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 
21 U.S.C.  
841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B)(vii), and operation and maintenance of a 
manufacturing facility for 
marijuana, in violation of 19 V.I.C.  608b.  Charles moved to suppress 
the evidence 
seized during the searches of the two houses and her car.  Officers Diaz 
and Levering 
testified, and Charles presented two witnesses to dispute the officers' 
testimony 
regarding the odor of marijuana plants.  Following the hearing on the 
motion to suppress, 
the government offered a demonstration in order for the District Court to 
observe the 
smell of growing marijuana.  The next day the District Court observed 
forty-seven live 
marijuana plants in a holding cell in the basement of the courthouse.  
Charles' counsel 
suggested that No. 8 would be a better location for the demonstration but 
he did not 
object to the demonstration which the government put forth. 
     The District Court issued a memorandum and order suppressing the 
results of the 
Ionscan but denied Charles' motion to suppress the evidence that resulted 
from the 
execution of the two search warrants for No. 8, Charles' car, and No. 11E.  
With regard 
to the results of the Ionscan, the District Court determined that the 
doorknob fell within 
the curtilage of the house, and held the swabbing of the doorknob to be an 
unconstitutional search.  
     The District Court denied the Motion to Suppress for No. 8 and 
Charles' car based 
upon "[t]he information the agents obtained from an informant, as verified 
by the agents' 
own observations of the exterior of the house and their plain smell of 
marijuana."  App. 
at 180.  Based upon the demonstration with growing marijuana plants, the 
District Court 
found that "[w]ithin a second or two of opening the door to the room 
containing the 
plants, the fragrance was noticeable.  Within another two or three 
seconds, the strong and 
distinctive odor permeated the hallway outside the room.  The viewing thus 
confirmed 
the government's evidence that green, growing marijuana plants have a very 
strong and 
distinctive odor."  App. at 170-71.  The District Court explained that 
despite the fact that 
Diaz's affidavit contained the results of the Ionscan (which the District 
Court 
suppressed), there was a "sufficient independent basis for probable cause 
that marijuana 
cultivation was taking place inside the house."  App. at 180.  The 
District Court also 
denied the Motion to Suppress the evidence seized at No. 11E.  Charles 
entered a 
conditional plea of guilty to Count One of the indictment, for the 
unlawful manufacture 
of marijuana. 
     Charles appeals the District Court's finding that Officers Diaz and 
Levering were 
lawfully present at No. 8 on May 20, 1999, from which the District Court 
found probable 
cause for the first search warrant issued based upon the plain smell 
doctrine.  Charles 
asserts that but for the Ionscan results obtained on May 19, 1999, the 
officers would not 
have returned the following morning to No. 8 nor smelled the marijuana 
when she 
opened the door.  Charles also asserts that the District Court erred in 
finding that 
probable cause existed for the two search warrants independent of the 
alleged 
unconstitutional Ionscan.   
     We agree with the District Court that there is sufficient basis to 
justify the search 
warrants, independent of the Ionscan which was suppressed.  The officers 
were lawfully 
present at No. 8 on May 19th and 20th.  We conclude that the results of 
the Ionscan did 
not taint the evidence obtained through the knock and talk on May 20, 
1999, or the 
subsequent execution of the search warrants.  The investigation by the 
officers of No. 8 
was ongoing and had not been resolved as of May 20, 1999.  We are 
reasonably 
confident that the officers would have returned to No. 8 on May 20th or 
thereafter, either 
with or without the results of the Ionscan.  Under a totality of the 
circumstances analysis, 
there was probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant on May 20, 
1999.  The 
subsequent warrant for No. 11E was therefore also valid.  It is 
unnecessary on the record 
before us to reach the constitutionality of the Ionscan and we reserve 
that question for 
another day. 
                              III. 
     We review the District Court's findings of the underlying facts for 
clear error but 
exercise plenary review as to conclusions of law.  See United States v. 
Acosta, 965 F.2d 
1248, 1250 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Inigo, 925 F.2d 641, 656 (3d 
Cir. 1991).  In 
reviewing the Order of the District Court upholding the Magistrate Judge's 
probable 
cause determination, we exercise a deferential review.  Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 
236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2331.  We must determine only "that the magistrate 
judge had a 
'substantial basis' for concluding that probable cause existed to uphold 
the warrant." 
United States v. Whitner, 219 F.3d 289, 296 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Gates, 
462 U.S. at 
238, 103 S.Ct. at 2331).            
                              IV. 
     Charles contends that the District Court erred by determining that 
the officers' 
presence at No. 8 on May 20 was legal.  She asserts that but for the 
allegedly illegal 
Ionscan results, the officers would not have knocked on the front door of 
No. 8 on May 
20th, the officers would not have been exposed to the alleged smell of 
growing marijuana, 
and there would have been no basis for the Magistrate Judge to make his 
probable cause 
determination.   
     We resolve this issue without addressing the constitutionality of the 
Ionscan.  The 
Fourth Amendment protects against "unreasonable searches and seizures."  
U.S. Const. 
amend. IV.  But not all encounters with law enforcement officials 
implicate the Fourth 
Amendment.  Only when the encounter restrains the person's liberty is the 
Fourth 
Amendment triggered.  So long as the encounter on May 20th was consensual 
and fell 
short of an investigative stop, the officers were lawfully present at No. 
8 on that date and 
did not need to make a showing of reasonable suspicion or probable cause.  
Contrary to 
Charles' position, the officers needed neither reasonable suspicion nor 
probable cause to 
knock on No. 8 on May 20th because the encounter fell short of an 
investigative stop and 
was consensual.  See United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 950 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(citing 
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386 (1991)); see 
also United 
States v. Jones, 239 F.3d 716, 720 (5th Cir. 2001) ("knock and talk" is "a 
reasonable 
investigative tool"); United States v. Hardeman, 36 F.Supp.2d 770, 777 
(E.D. Mich. 
1999) (noting that the "knock and talk" is "generally upheld as a 
legitimate method of 
investigation, designed to obtain a suspect's consent to search"); Davis 
v. United States, 
327 F.2d 301, 303 (9th Cir. 1964) ("Absent express orders from the person 
in possession 
against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public 
conduct which makes it 
illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person's right of privacy, 
for anyone 
openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the 
front door of 
any man's 'castle' with the honest intent of asking questions of the 
occupant 
thereof whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of 
the law."). 
     In United States v. Kim, we held that an encounter between an officer 
and an 
occupant of a roomette on a passenger train was consensual where the 
"totality of the 
circumstances" demonstrated that the exchange between the officer and 
defendant was 
voluntary and cooperative.  Kim, 27 F.3d at 954.  We explained that the 
location 
contributed very little to the argument that a reasonable person would not 
have felt free 
to terminate the encounter because a person "can reject an invitation to 
talk in a private, 
as well as a public space."  Id. at 952 (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437, 
111 S.Ct. at 
2387).  The "high expectation of privacy, alone, does not destroy the 
otherwise 
consensual nature of the encounter."  Kim, 27 F.3d at 953.  We also 
explained that asking 
potentially incriminating questions is permissible and does not make the 
encounter 
coercive the standard is whether an innocent reasonable person would feel 
compelled to 
cooperate.  Id. (citing Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438, 111 S.Ct. at 2388). 
     Because the law is clear that the officers did not need reasonable 
suspicion or 
probable cause on May 20th to knock at No. 8, the  issue is whether the 
encounter became 
coercive in the few seconds that passed from the moment Charles opened the 
door until 
the officers smelled marijuana.  The standard by which we determine 
whether the 
encounter between Charles and the police on May 20th was consensual 
depends on where 
the encounter took place.  See Kim, 27 F.3d at 951.  A distinction is made 
between an 
encounter in a public place, such as on a public street or in an airport 
terminal, where a 
person is free to simply walk away from inquiries, and Charles' situation 
where she was 
at her own home when the officers knocked on her door.  See, e.g., 
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 
430-34, 111 S.Ct. at 2384-86 (Bostick was confined on a bus and was not 
free to leave 
when officers approached him).  Because the encounter occurred at Charles' 
home, the 
test is "whether a reasonable person would feel free 'to disregard the 
police and go about 
his business,' id. at 434, 111 S.Ct. at 2386, or ultimately 'whether a 
reasonable person 
would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate 
the encounter,' id. 
at 436, 111 S.Ct. 2387, 'taking into account all of the circumstances 
surrounding the 
encounter.'" Kim, 27 F.3d at 951.  There is no evidence that the encounter 
between 
Charles and the two officers rose to a coercive exchange. 
     The fact that Charles did not consent to a search of her house shows 
that she did 
not feel coerced or pressured into allowing a search.  In addition, the 
exchange between 
the officers and Charles was short, and there is no evidence of repeated 
questioning or 
badgering behavior by the officers.  The officers asked approximately 3 
questions before 
they became aware of the scent of the marijuana. 
     The District Court, in affirming the Magistrate Judge's probable 
cause 
determination, correctly considered the odor of fresh growing marijuana in 
its probable 
cause determination.  We will not disturb the District Court's factual 
findings that the 
officers detected the scent of the marijuana plants from where they stood 
on the porch 
during their exchange with Charles.  Where there are two permissible views 
of the 
evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly 
erroneous. 
     While Charles recognizes that the officers did eventually obtain 
search warrants, 
she still asserts that the evidence discovered upon execution of those 
warrants to search 
her residences and car is inadmissible as "fruits of the poisonous tree," 
as stemming from 
the allegedly unconstitutional Ionscan.  
     Under a totality of the circumstances analysis, there was probable 
cause for the  
search warrant on May 20, 1999, given the informant's information, the 
officers' 
surveillance of No. 8, and the plain smell of marijuana observed during 
the knock and 
talk on May 20, 1999.  The results of the Ionscan did not taint the 
evidence obtained 
during the knock and talk, as we are reasonably confident that the 
officers would have 
returned on May 20, 1999, or thereafter, despite the results of the 
Ionscan given that their 
investigation was ongoing. 
     For the foregoing reason, the District Court's judgment of November 
11, 1999 will 
be affirmed.
                         
TO THE CLERK: 
          Please file the foregoing opinion. 
                              /s/Robert E. Cowen 
                                                                                
                              United States Circuit Judge
 
